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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The existence of a joint deposit is the evidentiary fact which has
been raised by virtue of the statute 5 to the status of a presumption.
During the joint lives of the parties it may be rebutted, but after the
death of either of them the same statute that created the presumption
gives it conclusive force. All this is solely by reason of the statute.
At common law it has been held that the mere fact that the joint
form of deposit was employed, is insufficient, of itself, to establish a
gift.6 In McDonald v. Sargent,7 decided under the statute, it was
intimated that a joint deposit in other than the statutory form might
give rise to a presumption that the account was so made for conveni-
ence only. Clearly no presumption of joint tenancy arises in the
absence of the statutory form, and clearly the statute was never
intended to raise a conclusive presumption of joint tenancy in a case
where there is no joint deposit, in the statutory form or otherwise, at
the time when the presumption becomes irrebuttable.
It is submitted that the dissenting opinion applies the statute in a
manner consonant with reason and authority and that, therefore,
there being no conclusive presumption in favor of the plaintiff by
reason of the inapplicability of the statute, the evidence offered to
prove that the joint account was opened for the convenience of the
deceased only, should have been received.
J. V. M.
BROKERS-WHEN LICENSE NECESSARY TO RECOVER COMMIS-
SlONS.-Plaintiff held himself out as a real estate broker in the city
of New York. Defendant employed him in the usual manner to bring
about a sale of his property. Plaintiff ultimately procured a purchaser
who accepted the defendant's offer, and thus brought about a sale of
the property. At the time of the broker's employment he did not have
a real estate broker's license as required by statute,' but procured it
before he brought the customer to the defendant and before he did
any work toward affecting a sale of the property. During all the
time that the negotiations took place and when the sale was consu-
mated, he was duly licensed. Plaintiff brought an action to recover
his commission. The defense interposed was that the plaintiff had
not complied with the statute, and hence, could not collect his com-
mission, a license being a prerequisite to such an action.2 Held, plain-
tiff was a licensed real estate broker according to the statute and was
entitled to his commission. All work done in his capacity as a broker
for which he was entitled to compensation, was done while he was
licensed. Calhoun v. Banner, 254 N. Y. 325, 172 N. E. 523 (1930).
'Laws of 1914, ch. 369.
'Kelly v. Beers, 194 N. Y. 49, 86 N. E. 890 (1909).
121 Misc. Rep. 437, 201 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1923).
N. Y. Real Property Law, sec. 440-A.
'Ibid., sec. 442-D.
RECENT DECISIONS
The apparent reason for the enactment of the statute was to
protect buyers and sellers of real property in their dealings with
brokers and to make a standard for the brokers of the state, it being
realized that they stand in a position of trust and confidence with
their clients.3 At the same time it was made a misdemeanor for a
person to carry on the business of a broker without such a license.4 It
is then, primary and definite in this state that a real estate broker
cannot recover a commission for his services without having possessed
a license on the date when his cause of action arose, and alleging and
proving this fact in the action.5 This is also true as to other statutes
requiring licenses for the conducting of certain businesses or profes-
sions, as for attorneys." The question then to be determined, is,
when does a broker's cause of action for commission arise? It is the
general understanding when a person employs a real estate broker or
agent to sell real estate for him, that the broker earns his compensa-
tion when he brings to his principal one who is ready, able, and willing
to contract with the latter on his terms, or, when an offer on different
terms is made by the buyer and accepted by the seller.7 It has been
held that even where it was the agreement between principal and
agent that the latter should wait for his commission until title passed,
and that even never came about, that he was entitled to his commis-
sion when the contract of sale was signed and could recover, the
agreement being nuduin pactum and unenforceable.8 If new terms
are added by the seller after a ready purchaser is procured and the
sale is not consummated, the agent has been allowed to recover.9 Per-
formance of the contract between the vendor and vendee is not
essential. 10 In all the above instances there was no question as to the
broker being licensed or as to the legality of his services. But when
this question arises the courts are careful to determine that there was
no illegality before they permit a recovery." Work done toward the
performance of his services while unlicensed is illegal, and thus the
'Roman v. Lobe, 213 App. Div. 162, 208 N. Y. Supp. 617 (2nd Dept.,
1925) ; szpra Note 1, sec. 441-E.
'Supra Note 1, sec. 442-F.
Rubin v. Brotter, 123 Misc. 928, 206 N. Y. Supp. 669 (1st Dept., 1924);
Bendell v. DeDominicis, 251 N. Y. 305, 167 N. E. 452 (1929); Robinson, New
York Real Property Law (1930), 265; 2 Gerard, New York Real Property
(6th ed.), 1179; Tiffany, Agency (2nd ed.), 77.
'Hall v. Bishop, 3 Daly 109 (N. Y., 1869); also in the case of a public
adjuster there can be no recovery for service rendered while unlicensed; Stake
v. Roth, 91 Misc. 45, 154 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1915).
"Davidson v. Stocky, 202 N. Y. 423, 95 N. E. 753 (1911); 2 Williston,
Contracts (1920), 1030; 2 Gerard, supra Note 5, 1080.
8 Ries v. Zimmerli, 224 N. Y. 351, 120 N. E. 692 (1918).
'Davidson v. Stocky, supra Note 7.
' Gilder v. Davis, 137 N. Y. 504, 33 N. E. 599 (1893).
"Tiffany, supra Note 5 at 162.
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whole service is rendered illegal and no recovery is permitted. 12 The
broker who performs such a service is deemed to be doing it gratis13
Even in an agreement where the broker is not to be paid until title
passes, if he did not have a license at the time of performing the
services, he cannot recover. 14 The instant case then, follows the long
line of decisions, in agreeing that the broker must be possessed of his
license during entire time of the performance of his services. But it
goes a step farther, too, and states that these services do not begin
with the employment but from the time the broker works to procure a
customer for his principal. This decision introduces the latest refine-
ment in the theory and is in all justice to both broker and client.
E. H. S.
CONDITIONAL SALES-PERSONAL PROPERTY-FIXTURE STATUTE
INAPPLICABLE TO GAS RANGEs.-Plaintiff sought an injunction re-
straining defendant from removing eighty-three gas ranges installed
by the usual means in an apartment house of which plaintiff was
owner, under a contract of conditional sale between the builder of
the apartment house, who was plaintiff's vendor, and the defendafit.
The stoves had been installed by defendant pursuant to the contract
of sale whereby the plaintiff's vendor covenanted to complete the
then partially constructed building and finish it "in a fashion similar
to buildings of the same type in said location." Some time after the
conveyance to plaintiff, the builder defaulted in his payments on the
gas ranges and went into bankruptcy. Defendant then, for the first
time, filed his conditional bill of sale of the stoves, reserving title in
himself and took steps to regain possession of them. Held, the reser-
vation of title in the conditional vendor was invalid against plaintiff,
a purchaser in good faith, for value without notice of the conditional
seller's rights. Alf Holding Corp. v. American Stove Co., 253 N. Y.
450, 171 N. E. 703 (1930).
Gas ranges have already been denominated personal property'
and the nature of property having a determinate legal character can-
' Roman v. Lobe, supra Note 3 (broker's license expired before he per-
formed his services; he renewed it before bringing his action; held, he could
not recover part of services being illegally rendered) ; Bendell v. DeDominicis,
stupra Note 5 (where broker was licensed when employed and when contract of
sale was signed, but not when he produced customer; he could not recover);
Goldin v. Shankroff, 125 Misc. 822, 211 N. Y. Supp. 569 (2nd Dept., 1925)
(where services were performed while broker was unlicensed, commission was
not to be paid until title passed; he had license when title passed but could not
recover. Court holding he must have license when services are performed).
3Stake v. Roth, 91 Misc. 45, 154 N. Y. Supp. 213 (1st Dept., 1915),
supra Note 6.
" Goldin v. Shankroff, supra Note 12.
'Central Union Gas Company v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10. 103 N. E. 822
(1913); Madfes v. Beverly Development Corporation, 251 N. Y. 12, 166 N. E.
787 (1929).
